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I.  Introduction 
There  is a  large body  of  empirical  literature that suggests  that unions 
can  and  do  raise the relative wages  of  their members.'  In addition, unions 
have  been  found to affect  the wages  of  non-union members.  although  the 
direction and  magnitude of  this effect  is somewhat  more  ambiguous.  Despite  an 
extensive literature that examines  the  effect  of  unions on  wages,  little 
attention has  been  paid to the  resultant employment  consequences  of this 
change  in the relative cost of unionized  labor.  The  purpose  of this study  is 
to examine  the effect  of unions  on  the  aggegate  level of employment  in the 
economy.  In section I1  of  this paper,  previous efforts to examine  this  L 
t 
question are discussed,  while  in section 111,  a theoretical model  of the  j 
effect  of  unions  on  employment  and  unemployment  is developed  and  analyzed.  In 
section IV,  this framework  is used  to  derive and  estimate employment  and  labor 
force participation equations.  The  empirical  analysis differs from previous 
efforts,  in part.  because it  explicitly captures  the  effect of  both the 
proportion unionized and  the  size of  the union wage  premium on  various 
measures  of employment.  In particular,  these  regressions provide estimates of 
the effect of differences in  union strength across  standard metropolitan 
statistical area  (SMSAs)  on  the  likelihood that an  individual  will be 
employed,  in  the  labor force,  or  unemployed.  By  examining  the effect  of 
unions on  the size of the  labor  force  and  on  the  total number  of employed, 
1.  See  Parsley  (1980)  for  a review of this voluminous  literature. 
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this study  also differs  from  much  of  the previous  work  that has  concentrated 
solely on  the effect  of  unions  on  the relative number  of  union and  non-union 
workers.  Finally,  by  examining whether  differences  in the  extent of  union 
power  across  labor markets  alter the  mix of  part-time and  full-time jobs.  this 
study  can  also analyze  the  effect  of unionism on  the  workweek. 
An  analysis of the employment  effects  of unionism can  play a role in 
assessing  the welfare implications of changes  in the extent of unionization in 
the  economy.  The  potentially deleterious effect  of  unions  on  employment  is 
also of importance  to those  interested in regional unemployment  differences.  A 
recent  study by Murphy  (1985)  found  that differences  in the  sensitivity to 
! 
demand  conditions in the  product market  and  wage  differentials  are vital in 1 
determining regional  differences  in  unemployment  rates.  Since unions  have  been 
found  to affect both of  these  variables.  differences in the extent or 
impact  of unionism may  be  important  in  understanding regional  unemployment 
rate differentials. In fact, Freeman  and  Medoff  (1984)  have  presented evidence 
that  suggests  that unemployment  rates are  1.0 percent  higher  in areas  with a 
high  degree  of  unionism relative to low  unionism areas.  However,  since  they 
also fail  to find any  correlation between  the degree  of unionism and  the 
employment  rate,  a further. more  explicit analysis of this question seems  to 
be  necessary  to determine  what  effect,  if  any,  unions  have  on  aggregate 
and  regional employment  rates. 
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11.  Previous Li  terature 
Despite  the rather extensive attention paid to the effect of unions on 
relative wages,  there has  been  scant  attention paid to the attendant 
employment  consequences.'  Most  of  the  studies done  on  the employment 
effects of unions have  been  on  the  industry level.'  Industry or firm 
studies,  however.  may  overestimate  the  disemployment  effect  of  unions,  because 
they  ignore  the  fact that some  or all of  the displaced workers  may  become 
employed  again  in  other  industries or firms.  Consequently,  these  studies 
cannot  provide estimates of  the net or aggregate employment  effect of unions. 
Lewis  (1963  and  1964)  provided  the  first analysis of  the relative wage  and) 
employment  effects of unions  on an  aggregate  basis.  In  these  papers,  Lewis 
divides the economy  into a  union and  a  non-union  sector.  Industries with a 
relatively high degree of unionism,  like manufacturing  and  mining,  were 
grouped  into the unionized  sector.  while  those with a  low  degree of unionism 
were  grouped  into a  non-union  sector."  Using  time series data,  he  estimates 
whether  changes  in  relative employment  levels across  these  two  sectors  can  be 
attributed to differences in  the average  unionlnon-union  wages  premium  and  the 
average percent unionized.  His results suggest  that unions 
2.  There  have  been  studies of the relative wage  effect  of unions  across 
industries,  occupations,  and  race and  gender  groups. 
3.  See  Lewis  (1963)  for a  review of  some  of  these  industry studies. 
4.  The  union sector was  made  up of  mining,  construction,  manufacturing, 
transportation,  and  communication  and  public utilities.  The  non-union 
sector was  made  up of all others,  except military and  government  relief. 
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worked. 
Pencavel  and  Hartsog (1984)  recently updated  and  extended  this seminal 
work.  However,  they failed  to find  any  consistently negative  impact of 
unionism on manhours.  In fact,  they conclude  that the hypothesis  that unionism 
depresses  manhours  can  be  accepted  only for  the  late 1920s  and  early 1930s. 
This  basic result is  not  sensitive to  whether  the employment  and  wage  effects 
of unions  are estimated with Lewis's reduced  form  model  or with a  structural 
model  that they developed.'' 
! 
The  ambiguity of  these  results may  be  due  aggregate data not being  L 
I 
well-suited to testing the  employment  effects of unionism.'  Aggregating 
industries  into two  sectors,  as  was  done  in these  studies,  ignores  the effects 
of unions  within these  sectors,  and  thus may  not yield good  estimates of  the 
overall  effect  of  unions  on  employment  and  wages.  Further,  the absence  of 
controls for  changes  in labor  quality across  sectors means  that these  studies 
might overestimate  the  impact of unions on  wages  and  underestimate  the effects 
on  employment.  That  is, if  firms respond  to the union wage  demands 
5.  The  structural model  of the  labor market  that is  used  by Pencavel  and 
Hartsog was  developed  to test for the wage  and  employment  effects  of 
unions  without assuming  that employment  is  unilaterally set by 
employers,  or that the union wage  premium  is  exogenous.  It  should also 
be  noted that their model  also differs from  that estimated by  Lewis 
(1964).  They  use only the percent organized variable to capture the 
effect of unionism and  not  the estimated union wage  premium. 
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by  substituting for higher  quality labor  then  "quality adjusted" wages  will 
not rise as  much  as  measured  wages."  Since  firms might reduce  their demand 
for unskilled workers  relative to skilled workers,  the effect on  total demand 
may  differ from that on  a particular  type of  labor.' 
Kahn  (1978),  Kahn  and Morimune  (19791,  and  Holzer  (1982)  provide 
cross-section estimates  of the  effects  of  variations in the  extent of union 
membership  across  SMSAs  on  employment,  hours  worked,  and  unemployment 
stability.  These  cross-section studies use  the  fraction  of employed  workers 
in  an  SMSA  who  are union members  as  their measure  of  union strength,  because 
it is felt that unionism  will affect  all workers  in the  same  labor market  and  I 
L 
not just those  in the  same  industry.  That  is,  workers  who  may  be  displaced  1 
because  of union  wage  demands  are likely to seek  employment  not just in that 
industry,  but  throughout  the local labor market.  By  using detailed 
cross-section data either from  the Current Population Survey  (CPS)  or the 
Survey  of Economic  Opportunity  (SEO),  these  studies are better able  to control 
for individual  characteristics and  labor market  variables  that affect 
employment.  These  cross-section studies seem  preferable  to the  aggregate  time 
series analyses,  because  they avoid some  of  the aggregation problems  that 
emerge  in  the  time  series  studies.  However,  like the time  series  studies 
mentioned  above,  the cross-section studies do not address  the  issue of 
6.  The  potential  importance of  these biases  can  be  seen  by  the fact  that 
the estimates of the quality-adjusted union relative wage  effect differ 
from those derived in  cross-section studies.  See  Parsley  (1980). 
7.  See  Pencavel  and  Hartsog (1984,  p.  216)  for  further  discussion of these 
1 imitations. 
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unionism occurs  primarily through  increased unemployment  or reduced  labor 
force size. 
In  any  case,  the results of  these  studies are again somewhat 
inconclusive.  Kahn  (1978)  finds  that annual  hours  worked  are  significantly 
reduced  for non-union  females  but not for  non-union males.  These  effects did 
not differ by race.  Holzer  (1982)  however  consistently finds a negative 
employment  effect  for  young  white males,  but not for  older white males  and 
black males.  His  results are sensitive to the  sample  year  and  the 
speci.fication of the estimated equation.  The  difference  in these  results could 
be  due  to  differences  in  sample  years,  or to the  fact  that Kahn  (1978) 
examines  annual  hours  worked.  whi le Holzer  (1982)  looks  at employment  level+. 
k 
> 
Given  this, it  might be  useful  to  examine  in  greater detail whether  the 
disemployment  effect of  unionism occurs  primarily through employment  levels or 
through  the number  of  hours  worked  for those who  remain employed.  Further, 
since Pencavel  and  Hartsog  (1984)  also found  that the employment  effect of 
unionism varies across  time.  it  ~ould  seem  that an  analysis using recent data 
would  be  valuable. 
In this section,  we  discuss  the effect of  unions on  the number  of  workers 
who  are employed,  unemployed,  and  in the  labor  force.  Much  of the  theory used 
in this section was  developed previously in  the minimum  wage  literature by 
Welch  (1974).  Gramlich  (19761,  and  Mincer (1976).  The  models 
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developed by these authors provide a useful  framework for analyzing the 
employment and unemployment consequences of the imposition of a union wage 
rate that is above the market clearing value.  The simple one-sector 
neoclassical  model yields fairly straightforward  predictions about the effects 
of unionism. As seen in figure 1, if  unions increase wages above the 
competitive wage level, W,,,  to W,,,  employment  (or  hours worked) will  fall 
from E,,  to E,,.  The reduction in employment in  this simple model results 
from profit-maximizing firms moving up their labor demand curves in response 
to union wage demands. ' 
8. It should be noted that this result relies on the assumption that in 
the face of union wage demands, employers remain on their labor demand 
curves when setting employment.  Although this assumption or model of 
employment determination is in widespread use, recent work by Barro 
(1977) and Pencavel and Hartsog (1984)  has called into question its 
validity.  An employment rule that allows firms to set employment after 
the wage is given has been shown to leave mutually beneficial  trades 
unexploited and involve a solution that leaves workers and firms off 
the contract curve.  An optimal employment rule would involve the joint 
determination of employment and wages by labor and management.  Under 
such a rule, movements in union wages need not be associated with 
movements along the labor demand curve and resultant reductions in 
employment.  However, since observed union contracts leave the 
employment deci  s  ion to management, we assume that employment  i s 
determined unilaterally without attempting to explain why contracts 
take this form. 
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in employment  translates  into an  equal  increase  in the  level of involuntary 
unemployment.  In  this case  E, -  E,,  workers  would  like to work,  but are 
unable  to  gain employment  at the new  union wage  rate.  Thus,  in the  context of 
a  simple one-sector model  with a  fixed labor  force,  the employment  and 
unemployment  effects  of  unions  are of equal  magnitude.  If labor  is elastically 
supplied however,  the effect  on measured  unemployment  of  an  increase 
in  union  wages  is  ambiguous.  In this case,  E, -  E,,,  workers  want 
employment,  but cannot  get it  at the union wage  (see  figure  1).  These  workers 
will show  up  as  unemployed  only if  they continue  to engage  in search  for  the 
rationed E,,  jobs.  As  Welch  (1974)  pointed out,  the  determination of how 
! 
many,  if  any,  of  them  will remain  in the  labor  force requires a model  of 
> 
probabilistic search behavior.  Consequently,  this simple model  yields 
ambiguous  predictions about  the effect of unions on  the measured  unemployment, 
but predict unambiguously  that employment  will fall. 
A  fundamental  problem with this simple  one-sector analysis  is that it 
does  not allow for  the possibility that there are non-union workers  in 
the  economy.  Consequently,  this simple model  may  be  useful  in  analyzing  the 
employment  effects of unions  within a  firm,  but will be  of limited value  in 
studying the  industry-wide or  aggregate  consequences.  Multi-sector models  that 
allow for the presence  of a  non-union  sector  have  been  developed by  Johnson 
and  Mieszkowski  (1970)  and  Diewert  (1974).  These  general  equilibrium models 
examine  the  impact of  unions  on non-union wages  in a  world with varying 
factor intensities.  Within the minimum  wage  literature,  Welch  (1974).  Mincer 
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the employment and unemployment effects of legislated wage floors, but they 
have typically assumed that factor  intensities do not vary across sectors. 
In a multi-sector model, an increase in  wages in the union sector again 
leads to  a reduction in employment in the unionized sector. as employers move 
up their labor demand schedules. The higher wage, W,,,  creates an excess 
supply of workers who are now willing to work in  the non-union sector if  the 
non-union wage is also W.,.  The addition of these workers to the non-union 
sector shifts out the supply cur-ve  in  that sector.'  This increase  in  the 
supply of  labor  in  the non-union sector will alter either wages or employment 
in the non-union sector, and most likely both."' 
9.  Gramlich  (1976) has noted that if  union jobs go  to workers with the 
lowest reservation wage, then the supply curve for workers in  the 
non-union sector would shift out  only in that region above the 
reservation wages of the displaced workers.  If jobs are assigned 
randomly then a parallel shift in the labor supply curve will occur. 
10. Mincer's (1976) analysis implies that the existence of  a union premium 
may cause some worker-s to prefer being unemployed, but in  the queue 
for union jobs to being employed in  the non-union sector. 
Consequently, a union wage premium may cause labor to flow from the 
non-union to  union sector.  He has shown that a net flow of  labor from 
the union to non-union sector occurs if  the elasticity of demand for 
labor exceeds the turnover rate in the union sector.  As noted by 
Holzer (1982).  given the low turnover rates in the unionized-sector, 
this condition will  in general  be met. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-  10 - 
The  effect an total employment,  D,,  depends  upon  the  impact  of  unions on 
average  wages  in the  economy. 
a 
where  w  =  the percentage change  in average  wages. 
q  =  the elasticity of  labor  demand. 
The  change  in  average  wages  is a  weighted average of the percentage change  in 
wages  in the  union and  non-union sectors. 
where  k  =  percent of employment  that is unionized 
h, =  percentage  change  in wages  in  sector i  . 
From  (2)  we  can  see  that the effect on  aggregate  employment  of an  increase  in 
union wages  (or  in the percent of the workforce  that is  organized)  will depend 
on  the  impact of such  a  change  on  non-union  wages.  Average  wages,  and  hence 
employment,  will change  as  long as: 
Welch  (1974)  has  shown  that in  a  two-sector model  with constant 
intensities,  the changes  in  non-union wages  will be a  function of  the 
elasticity of labor  supply,  E  the percent unionized,  k, and  the change  in 
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(1-k)  +  cw,, 
From  (4)  we  see  that unless  the elasticity of  labor  s~noly  is  zero 
(E =  0). non-union wages  will not fall enough  to  prevent average wages  from 
rising and  total employment  from falling.  Falling wages  in the non-union 
sector  cause  workers  with high reservation wages  to withdraw  from the  labor 
force,  thus  causing  total  employment  to  decline."  Using  (2) and  (4) we  can 
express  the elasticity of total employment  with respect  to  union wage  changes 
as :  t 
(5) ao,  =  k., ,  w,: 
aw.,  =  ( I-k)  +  Ew,, 
The  higher  the elasticity of  supply,  c.  or the greater  the  percent 
organized,  k,  the greater  the disemployment  effect  associated with an  increase 
in  union  wages.  However,  if labor supply is inelastic,  total employment  will 
remain  fixed." 
11.  See  Welch  (1974,  p.  304,  equation  6).  The  change  in  non-union  wages 
is  not a  function  of the elasticity of  labor demand  in  this model 
because of his assumption  that the elasticity is constant across 
sectors.  Thus,  while a high elasticity of demand  leads  to a  bigger 
disemployment  effect in  the union  sector,  it  also means  that more 
workers  will gain non-union employment  as  wages  fall. 
12  It is  possible that the existence of  a union wage  premium may 
actually draw  more  workers  into the labor  force than cause  them to 
exit because of the depressed non-union wage  rate.  This  will occur, 
however  only if the  turnover rate exceeds  the elasticity of demand 
for  labor.  As  noted earlier,  this condition is  unlikely to hold in 
the union sector. 
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unions on wages  in the  non-union sector  and  hence  on  total employment.  is 
ambiguous. If  the unionized  sector  is the  labor-intensive sector  then,  as 
shown  in Johnson  and  Mieszkowski  (1970),  both the substitution and  the  scale 
effect will result in  a reduced capital/labor ratio in the non-union sector, 
and  hence  a reduction in the marginal  product of  labor and  wages.  However, 
with a capital-intensive unionized sector.  non-union workers  will get higher 
wages  if the  scale effect is greater  than  the  substitution effect  and  lower 
wages  if the converse  is true.  In either case.  increases  in  union wages  or in 
the percent of the labor force that  is unionized will tend  to  be  associated 
! 
with an  increase  in average  wages  and  a fall  in total employment,  as  1ong;as 
J 
labor supply  is not completely  inelastic. 
Work  by  Mincer  (1976)  has  suggested  that a growing union wage  differential 
may  also generate "permanent" or "equilibrium unemployment."  because  dages 
will not fall  to the  level  to equilibrate the  supply and  demand  for  labor  in 
the  non-union sector.  Wages  will remain above  this equilibrium level  because 
some  workers  who  do not have  union sector  jobs may  prefer  to remain  unemployed 
until one  of these  jobs opens  up.  The  existence of workers  who  prefer to 
search rather than accept employment  in the non-union  sector  leads  to 
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voluntary,  or search, unemployment similar to the official definition 
I  /  of unemployment. 
In the long run, the movement of workers across sectors will  lead  to 
an equilibration of the expected utility of the wages in  the 
two sectors. That is, the expected utility of a relatively more 
certain non-union job will  equal  the expected utility of a more 
uncertain but higher-paying union job;  for  risk-neutral  workers, the 
e.<pected  value of wages in  the two sectors wi 11 be equal.  '"  Thus,  we have 
where 
P  is  the probability of being employed  in  the union sector, and W,,  and 
. , 
W,,  are wages in  the union and non-union sector, respectively." 
(7) z  =  W,,  -  W,  =  1  -  p 
W ,.  P 
13. It should be noted that this model  makes the strong assumption that 
workers can not engage in search while employed in the non-union 
sector.  The Grarnlich-Mincer model  can be modified, however, to 
incorporate search while employed without any changes in  the 
qualitative nature of its predictions.  See Brown,  Gilroy and Kohen 
(1982) for a discussion of this issue. 
14. Gramlich  (1976)  allows for the existence of transfers like 
unemployment insurance.  This raises the expected value of  union- 
sector compensation, but does not alter the qualitative nature of our 
results. 
15. Following Mincer (19761, we are assuming that the probability of 
getting employment in  the non-union sector is 1. 
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number  of vacancies  in the  covered  sector relative to the number  of job 
seekers.  If  employment  in the union  sector equals  D,,,  and  the  turnover  or 
vacancy  rate is  6,  then the probability of  finding a job in the union  sector 
is: 
where  U  is the number  of  unemployed  job seekers.  As  shown  in Mincer  (19761, 
I 
the  voluntary unemployment  rate can  be  expressed  as  a function of the unfon 
# 
wage  effect,  the percent organized,  and  the  turnover rate: 
(9)  U,  =  U  =  k6z 
I 
D., +  D,,  +  U  k6zf 1 
From  (9) we  can  see  that increases  in the percent organized or the union 
wage  premium  will lead to an  increase  in  unemployment  relative to 
employment. ' " 
16.  This  assumes  that changes.in union coverage have  no  effect on  the 
unionlnon-union  wage  differential.  Although  there is currently 
debate over whether  changes  in  coverage may  increase  the union wage 
of premium,  there is no evidence  to  suggest  that it  decreases  it. 
Thus.  the qualitative nature of'these predictions  is  unlikely to be 
altered by relaxing this assumption. 
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Intuitively, as unions increase their wage demands, employers move further 
up their demand curves, thus restricting employment in  the covered  sector. 
This displacement of workers from the unionized sector leads to an  increase in 
the supply of non-union workers. a rise in  unemp1oyment. or both. Unemployment 
rises because some workers opt to search for a union job rather than accept 
! 
employment at a non-union job for a lower wage. Unless the elasticity  i 
1 
of  labor supply in the non-union sector is zero. the increas'ed supply 
of workers to the non-union sector will  also result in some labor force 
withdrawals."  Increases in  the extent of coverage has a similar effect on 
employment and unemployment because it involves an increase in  the 
effective  cost of labor in  the union sector. 
IV. Empirical  Results 
To  test for the employment and unemployment effects of  unions, we used 
data from the 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS) Earnings File and Census 
data on SMSA characteristics. This data set was chosen. in part, because it 
contains detailed personal  characteristics for each respondent that allow us 
17.  Labor flows in this direction as long as the turnbver rate is lower 
than the elasticity of demand for labor in the union sector.  Given 
the low turnover rates in unionized jobs, we might expect that in 
general  this condition will  hold. 
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to  control  for  d'ifferences  in  worker  quality.  In addition,  it  contains 
earnings and  union membership  data across  individuals in  each  SMSA.  To  insure 
a  sufficient sample  size in  each of the 44  SMSAs  in  our  sample  we  combined  the 
survey  responses  for  each month  over  the year,  which  yielded 104,409 
observations. 
18 
To  examine  the disemployment  effect of  unions,  we  initially looked at the 
effect of unionism on  the probability of  someone  in  the population being 
employed.  Because  displaced workers  from the  unionized  sector may  become 
either unemployed or withdraw  from the  labor  force,  the employment  and 
unemployment  effects  of unionism need  not be  the  same.  Since  the distinction 
! 
between  unemployed  and  not-in-the labor force  may  not be  that strong,  and  some 
of those  displaced by  unions may  withdraw from  the  labor force.  the 
probability of  being employed may  be  a better measure  of  the "true" 
disemployment  effect  of unionism than the probability of being counted as 
unemployed.  An  additional  benefit from focusing on employment  status  is that 
we  can  examine  whether  unionism has  different effects on  the  likelihood of 
gaining part-time versus  full-time employment.  These  effects may  differ 
substantially if  unionism affects  the  length of  the workweek  for  those  who 
remain employed. 
18.  Beginning  in  1981,  the CPS  reduced  the number  of surveyed individuals and 
asked detailed employment  questions of  only one-quarter of  the sample  each 
month.  As  a result,  the number  of union members  in  many  of  the SMSAs  in 
any  given month  is too  small  to allow us  to  have  sufficient degrees  of 
freedom  for estimation. 
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and  unemployment  is a  function of  both the percent organized and  the union 
wage  premium.  Consequently,  as  suggested by  equations  (5) and  (9>, the 
measure  of the effect of  unionism that we  used  is the product of  the percent 
of employment  in  an  SMSA  that is unionized and  the  union/non-union  wage 
differential.'.'  This  index  is similar  to  the Kaitz index,  widely used  in 
the minimum wage  literature for  examining potential disemployment  effects of a 
legislated wage  increase  above  competi:i\~e levels." 
Previous  cross-section work  by  Holzer  (1982).  Kahn  and  Morimune  (1979). 
and  Kahn  (1978)  has  implicitly constrained the effect of unions  on employment 
to operate  solely through differences  in the  percent organized  acr-oss  SMSAs.  ! 
, 
This constraint is analogous  to requiring that the union relative wage  effect 
be  the  same  across  SMSAs,  which might be  inappropriate  for  theoretical  and 
econometric  reasons. 
19.  We  restrict our  sample  to the nonfarm  economy  when  we  are calculating 
both the union wage  premium and  the  percent of  employed  that are union 
members.  The  sample  was  restricted to  civilians age  16-65  working for 
wages  and  salary. 
20.  In  minimum  wage  studies,  Ehrenberg  (1980)  and  Welch  (1978)  have 
suggested  that this type of  index  implicitly constrains  the percent 
covered and  wage  premium  to have  symmetric  effects on employment  or 
unemployment.  They  have  suggested  several  alternative measures  that 
allow for  different effects  from  the percent covered and  the wage 
premium.  As  a check  on  the sensitivity of our  results to this 
restriction,  we  estimated our employment  equations  with indexes  that 
rise more  than proportionately with changes  in the percent unionized 
or  with the union wage  premium.  The  qualitative nature of  our results 
were  not sensitive to the use of  these other indexes. 
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unionized  in  an  industry or region is not a good  measure  of  union power.  He 
shows  that to the degree  the  cost of  running a union differs across 
industries,  different  wagelemployment  packages  will be  negotiated by unions 
facing  thel same  opportunity locus or having the same  strength.  That  is, 
unions  in  industries where  costs are high will tend to prefer  higher- 
wagellower-employment  share  packages  than  will unions  in relatively low-cost 
markets.  Consequently,  the  per-cent of  employment  that is unionized or the 
union wage  premium  will vary across  industries or regions,  even  though union 
power  is the  same.  Greater  union  strength will be  indicated by a better 
wagelemployment  share package  and  not just a higher  percent unionized.  ! 
b 
Consequently.  it  is necessary  to control for both the wage  premium  and  the! 
percent unionized  in  order  to  get a measure  of  union  strength across markets. 
To  the degree  the union relative wage  effect  differs across  SMSAs,  failure to 
control  for differences  in the  wage  premium  will yield inefficient  and 
potentially biased estimates.  Since  the union wage  premium may  be  determined 
by many  of the  same  exogenous  variables that determine  employment,  this term  is 
likely to  be  correlated with the  independent  variables  in the model.  The 
result might be  that the  estimated coefficients in previous  studies  are biased. 
To  construct our measure  of  union strength,  it was  first  necessary  to 
derive an estimate of the  unionlnon-union  wage  differential in  each  SMSA.  To 
do  this,  we  estimated separate wage  equations  for union and  non-union members 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyin each  SMSA 
(11)  In  W,,  =  B  X,, +  e.. 
where  W,,  is average  hourly earnings  of  individual, i,  in  SMSA,  k,  X,,  is  a 
vector of individual  characteristics that determine  wages;  and  e,  is an  error 
term.  In estimatinq these  wage  equations,  we  included controls  for-  scho.3ling. 
experience,  experience  squared,  occupati~n,  industry,  r-ace,  gender-,  full-time, 
veterans,  and  marital  status.'  From  (11)  the  unionlnon-union  wage 
differential for each  SMSA,  z,,  wa.s  calculated as: 
where  B  represents  the estimated coefficients from  the union or non-union  wage 
regression,  andXis the mean  value of the  individual  characteristics in each 
SMSA. 
This  procedure  treats union  status  as  exogenous  when  estimating  the  union 
wage  premium.  Work  by  Heckman  (1978)  and  Duncan  and  Leigh (1985)  and  others 
suggests  that this may  yield biased estimates of  the "true" union wage  effect, 
because it  ignores  the  selectivity problem associated with the  joint 
determination of union membership  and  the  union  wage  premium.  Work  by  Freeman 
21.  Since  the respondents  were  asked only asked  their union status,  and 
the earnings questions  in  the last month of  their rotation in  the CPS 
sample,  we  also included monthly dummies  to control. for seasonal 
variations. 
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and  Medoff  (1981.)  and  Freeman  (1984)  however,  suggests  that current 
econometric  techniques  for  addressing this problem  suffer from extreme 
sensitivity to changes  in  sample  period or model  specification.  Consequently, 
they have  argued  against using such  corrections  as  the  inverse of the Mills 
ratio in estimating this differential,  and  instead,  advocate using ordinary 
least squares  (OLS)  estimates,  which  do  not appear  to suffer from  these 
problems.  Because  we  are only interested in the effect of variations in the 
size of this premium  on  employment  and  not  in its level per  se,  we  have  chosen 
to use  the  estimates  from these OLS  regressions.  Although selectivity bias may 
mean  that the estimated  wage  differentials  are biased upwards,  it  is not clear 
why  the  selectivity bias  should vary across  SMSAs  in  a way  that is 
correlated with the  error term in our  employment  equation.  In the absence  of 
C 
this kind of correlation,  the employment  equations  should  sti  11  yield unMased 
estimates of the effect of  union  strength on  employment  and  unemployment. 
In  examining potential disemployment  effects of  unions,  we  attempted  to 
control  for  other factors  besides  unionism  that may  shift either the  supply or 
demand  for labor and  hence  affect the  likelihood that an  individual  will be 
employed.  Included in the model  is a vector of individual characteristics 
that may  affect either the  supply or demand  for labor as  well  as  SMSA  specific 
characteristics  that reflect local  labor market  conditions.  In  particular,  we 
control for differences  in schooling.  potential labor market  experience,  race, 
gender,  marital status,  geographic  region,  size of  SMSA,  local unemployment 
rate,  and  the percent of  the population in an  SMSA  that receives Aid to 
Fami 1  ies wi  th  Dependent  Chi ldren (AFDC) . '' 
22.  We  also included monthly dummies  to control for seasonal  variations  in 
employment. 
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The resulting employment equation  is: 
where E,,  is an index that indicates the employment status of the ith 
individual  in  the kth SMSA. Z,,  is a vector of personal  and SMSA-specific 
characteristics that affect that probability of being employed, and UN,  is 
the measure of union strength. 
The r-esults  of estimating these linear probability employment equations 
for the employed workers and for part-time and full-time employed workers  ! 
L 
separately are presented in  table  1 .' :  The signs of the variables that 
> 
control for local  labor market conditons and individual characteristics are 
generally consistent with theoretical  predictions. Increases in  human capital 
(schooling  and experience) and local demand  (lower  unemployment)  lead to 
increases in  the likelihood that an individual  will  be employed. Conversely, 
increases in  the fraction of  the population receiving AFDC has a negative. 
albeit insignificant, effect on the likelihood of being employed. As seen in 
regression  (I),  increases in union strength have a negative and significant 
impact on the probability of  being employed. Thus, the fraction of  the 
23. There are several well-known problems with the linear probability 
model, having to do with heteroscadasticity and prediction that lie 
outside the 0-1  interval.  Because of the cost of  estimating  logit 
equations with a data set this large, however, we have not attempted 
to  estimate this model  using maximum likelihood techniques. 
Nonetheless, the estimates from the linear probability model should be 
consistent. 
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unionism and  the union wage  premium.  The  magnitude  of  this effect  can  be 
captured by  calculating the change  in  the probability of being employed  for a 
base  case  or average  worker.  when  the  value of the union  strength variable 
changes  by one  standard deviation from its mean  value:"  The  expected 
probability of being employed  was  found  to  decline from  0.829  to 0.825  with 
this increase  in union strength.  Alternatively.  the probability of being 
employed  for  our  average  worker  in  the SMSA  where  union strength  is  highest 
(San  Bernardino,  CA.)  is only about  2  percent  less  than if  that worker  lived 
in the  SMSA  where  union  strength is the  least (Atlanta,  GA.)."  Thus,  it 
would  appear  that changes  in  the extent of union strength have  only a very 
limited impact  on  aggregate employment.  Changes  in schooling,  experience,  qr 
k 
local  labor. market  conditions have  a much  greater  impact  on  the  likelihood Bf 
being employed  than unionism.  For  instance,  a  standard deviation  increase 
in the number  of  years  of  schooling  increases  the  likelihood of being 
employed  for the  base  case  worker  about  10.6  percent,  while a standard 
deviation increase  in the number  of years  of potential  labor market 
24.  The  base  case  worker  is a single white male  with 12.6  year-s of 
schooling,  18.5  years of experience who  lives  in the 
East-North-Central region of the United States  in an  SMSA  with an 
unemployment  rate of 9.4  percent  in  March.  a  population of 3,479,000, 
where  5.5  percent of  the population receives AFDC,  and  the union 
strength variable equals  0.031 
25.  The  union  strength variable ranges  from 0.0795  to -0.0015.  In  San 
Bernardino,  the probability of being employed  is  0.818  while it  is 
0.836  in  Atlanta. 
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From regressions  (2) and  (3). we  see  that unionism will affect the 
length of the workweek  for  those who  remain employed.  If unionism has  no 
effect on hours  worked,  then the effect  on  the probability of working 
full-time should be  the same  as  it  is  on  the likelihood of  working part-time. 
Conversely,  if employers  reduce  the hours  worked of  those  that they keep 
employed,  then our union variable should be  positive in the part-time 
regression and  negative  in the full-time regression.  We  found  that this is 
indeed  the case.  The  union variable was  negative and  significant in the 
full-time employment  equation,  while it  was  positive but  insignificant  in the  ! 
L 
part-time employment  equation. Using  these  estimated coefficients,  we  can  see  r 
that a standard deviation increase  in union strength leads  to  a 0.7  percent 
reduction  in the probability of  being employed  full-time and  a 1.0  percent 
increase  in the probabi  1 i  ty  of  being employed part-time."  In  addition, 
both  the  point estimate and  the degree of  significance of the union strength 
variable are much  higher  in the  full-time equation than  in the  total 
employment  equation.  These  results suggest  that part of  the  disemployment 
effect of unions  comes  through reducing  the number  of  hours  worked on  that 
job. 
26.  The  standard deviation for  schooling  is  2.9  years  and  14.4  years  for 
experience. 
27.  The  probability of  being employed  full-time and  part-time for our base 
case  workers  is  0.677  and 0.152,  respectively. 
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equation with the dependent  variable as  the probability of  working part-time 
given that the  individual  was  employed.  Unions  may  reduce  the workweek  by 
increasing the  relative frequency  of part-time jobs relative to full-time 
jobs.  As  seen  in  regression  (4) in table  1,  increases  in  union strength 
increase  the  fraction of  employment  that is part-time.  A  standard deviation 
increase  in  union strength increases  the  likelihood of working part-time for 
the base  case  worker  by about  3  percent.'"  Given  these  estimates,  the 
average  worker  is about  19  percent  less  likely to be  working  full-time in the 
highest union strength SMSA  than he  is in the  lowest union strength SMSA. 
Thus.  these  estimates  suggest  that increases  in  union wages  or the percent 
I 
organized might have  a bigger  effect  on hours  worked  per  week  or the mix  06 
r 
full-time and  part-time jobs  than on  the level of total employment. 
In  section 111.  it  was  shown  that the disemployment  effect  of unions  was 
a function of the elasticity of  labor  supply.  The  greater  the elasticity of 
supply,  the  greater the disemployment  effect. Given  this,  we  might  expect  that 
the disemployment  effect  would  be  largest for groups  with a weak  labor  force 
28.  The  probability of  working  part-time for the base  case  worker  is 
0.1429.  The  base  case  worker  in this sample  is  again a single white 
male  with 13.2  years of  schooling,  17.8  years  of experience who  lives 
in  the East-North-Central region of the United States  in  an  SMSA  with 
an  unemployment  rate of  9.2  percent  in  March.  a population of 
3,391,600,  where  5.5 percent of the population received AFDC,  and  the 
union strength variable equals  0.031. 
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be  more  adversely affected  than older-  workers,  whi le females  may  suffer  more 
than males.  To  test for  differences  in the disemployment  effect across  groups, 
we  estimated  separate  employment  equations  for  part-time and  full-time workers 
by  gender  and  age  group.  These  results are presented  in tables 2  and  3. 
The  basic predictions of  our  theory seem  to hold.  Based  on  the point 
estimates  from these  regressions,  we  see  that the disemployment  effect of 
unions  is smaller  for prime  age  males  than  for-  teenagers  or 20-24 year  old 
males.  In  fact, prime  age  males  do not appear  to be  adversely affected by 
changes  in  union  strength at all.  This probably reflects their strong labor 
force attachment  or low  elasticity of  labor  supply.  Interestingly,  the 
t 
I  b 
evidence  does  not support  the hypothesis  that teenagers  are more  adversely  t 
affected than 20-24 year olds.  As  expected,  the disemployment effect of 
1  ,A 
unionism is greater for prime age  females  than for prime age  males:  In 
general,  increases  in the  union wage  premium or the percent organized also 
affect  the workweek  or the  likelihood of  being employed  part-time more  for 
females  than for  males. 
To  investigate whether  the disemployment  effect of union works  primarily 
through increasing unemployment  or decreasing  labor  force participation,  we 
also estimated an  equation where  the dependent  variable is the likelihood of 
being in the  labor force. If  unionism primarily reduces  the  size of  the  labor 
29.  The  adverse effect of unionism increases with age  for females. 
Whether  this reflects  a greater attachment  to  the labor force is  a 
question for further research. 
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force,  then  the coefficient  on  the union strength variable  in the  labor  force 
regression should equal  that in the employment  regression.  The  results from 
estimating  the  labor  force  participation equation are presented in  regression 
(5)  in table  1. 
The  union coefficient is both negative and  significant in this regression. 
The  point estimate on  this term  is about  25  percent bigger  than it  is in the 
employment  equation.  This  suggests  that increases  in  union strength cause 
both an  increase  in the number  of  unemployed  workers  and  a reduction  in  labor 
force participation.  When  these equations  were  estimated for different  gender 
and  age  groups.  we  found  that,  in  general.  females  suffered  a bigger  labor 
i 
force effect than males.  This  was  particularly true when  comparing prime 
t 
age  males  and  females. ''  Based  on  the regressions  in table 1,  however,  it 
would  appear  that the disemployment  effect  of unionism results primarily from 
a reduction in the  size of the labor force and  not from an  increase  in the 
numbel-  of unemployed.  Thus,  unemployment  rates will tend  to be  higher  in 
regions  with a high degree  of  union  strength,  primarily because  of a reduction 
in the  size of  the  labor  force,  and  not because  of an  increase  in the number 
of unemployed.  It should be  noted,  however,  that the magnitude of the effect 
of changes  in  union strength on  the  labor force is quite small.  A  standard 
deviation increase  in  union  strength reduces  the  likelihood of being  in the 
labor  force by only 0.1  percent.''  Our  average or base  case  worker  is  about 
3  percent  less  likely to  be  in the  labor force  if he  resides  in  the 
30.  These  results are available from the author  upon  request. 
31.  The  likelihood of  being  in the  labor force for our base  case  worker  is 
0.895. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-  27  - 
highest union  strength SMSA  than if  he  resides  in the  lowest  union  strength 
SMSA. 
V.  Conclusions 
In this paper,  we  present estimates of  the  effect  of changes  in  union 
strength on  the  likelihood of  being employed or in the  labor force.  The 
results of  this paper  suggest  that in areas  where  the percent of the  labor 
force that  is unionized  is high or where  the unionlnon-union  wage  premium  is 
large;  workers  are less likely to  be  employed  or in the  labor force  and  more 
likely to  be  unemployed.  Besides  altering the number  of  workers  employed  or in 
i 
the  labor  force,  unions  reduce  the  likelihood of  having  a full-time job by 
altering the mix of part-time and  full-time jobs  in the economy.  Thus,  unions 
appear  to adversely affect the average  workweek  for  those  who  remained 
employed.  These  disemployment  effects  from  unions  were  concentrated mainly 
among  females  and  young  men.  with little if  any  negative  impact  on  prime age 
males.  These  disemployment  effects,  howevel-,  were  in general  found  to  be 
quite small.  with unionism having a more  pronounced  effect on  the  mix of 
part-time and  full-time employment,  and  hence  the  workweek,  than on  the number 
of jobs.  All of these effects were  dwarfed  in importance  by  the  state of the 
local  labor market  and  the  level of  an  individual's human  capital or skills. 
32.  The  probability of being in the  labor force  for the base  case  worker 
is  0.881  in  San  Bernardino and  0.908  in  Atlanta. 
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The  data for  this study  come  from the Current Population Survey  1983  and 
from  the Bureau  of Census,  County  and City --  Data Book.  1982. 
UN  is the product of the percent unionized  and  the union wage  premium 
in  each  SMSA. 
Unemployment  Rate  is the  local unemployment  rate for  all workers  in 
the SMSA. 
Population  is the number  of people  living in the SMSA. 
AFDC  is the proportion of the population in the  SMSA  receiving AFDC 
payments . 
Schooling  is the number  of years  of schooling  completed by  the 
individual. 
Experience  is calculated as  Age  -Schooling -6 
Race  is  a dummy  that equals  1  if the  individual  is white. 
Sex  is  a dummy  that equals  1  is the  individual  is  a male. 
In addition to these  variables,  each  regression  contains  a dummy  term 
that equals  1  if the  individual  is  married,  nine regional  dummies 
where  the omitted category  is the East-North-Central region,  and  11 
monthly dummies  to control  for the month  the  individual was  surveyed. 
The  complete regression results are available from the  author  upon 
request  . 
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The  data  for this study come  from  the Current Population Survey  1983  and 
from the Bureau of  Census,  County and  City Data Book.  1982. 
UN  is  the product of  the percent unionized and  the  union wage  premium 
in each  SMSA. 
Unemployment  Rate  is the  local unemployment  rate for all workers  in 
the  SMSA. 
Population is the number  of  people  living in the SMSA 
AFDC  is the proportion of the  population in the SMSA  receiving AFDC 
payments . 
Schooling  is the number  of  years  of  schooling completed  by  the 
individual. 
Experience  is calculated as  Age  -Schooling -6. 
Race  is  a dummy  that equals  1  if the  individual is white. 
Sex  is a dummy  that equals  1  is the  individual  is a male. 
In addition to these  variables,  each  regression contains  a dummy  term 
that equals  1  if the  individual  is  married,  nine regional  dummies 
where  the om.itted category  is  the East-North-Central  region,  and  11 
monthly dummies  to control  for the month  the  individual was  surveyed. 
The  complete regression results are available  from the author upon 
request  . 
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Variables  -  (1)  -  (2)  (3)  -  (4)  -  (5) 
Constant  .I23  -.  121  .2  44  .587  .319  *  t* 
(9.75)  (- 9-28)  (  26.2)  (43.4)  (  27.2) 
Unemployment 
rate  -.  974  -1.01  .032  .34  1  -.  355  *  I  *  * 
Population  - .001  .002  - .003  - .004  - .003  k 
t  *  *  r 
AFDC  -1 -38  -.  005  -.I33  -.  146  -.  341  * 
(- 1.33)  (-.05)  (-1.731  (-1.34)  (-3.521 
School  i ng  .030  .03  1  - .001  -.013  -023 
* 
(  60.5)  (  61.3)  (-  3.63)  (-24.9)  (  49.1) 
Experience  .02  1  -029  - .008  -.021  .021  *  *  * * 
(  58.6)  (  78.8)  (-30.6)  (-52.1  1  (  61.1) 
Sex 
Race  .093  .045  .047  .035  .047  * 
(  25.4)  (  12.2)  (  17.4)  (  8.72)  (  13.8) 
Notes:  See data Appendix for a description of the independent variables. 
significant at 0.10  level. 
** signficiant at 0.05  level. 
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Males  Females 
Variables  1 6-  1 9  20-24  25-65  16-19  20-24  25-65 
Cons  tan  t  -.  939  -.  236  -408  -.  885  - .664 
4  4  4  *  **  4  4  .360 
f 
Unemployment 
rate  -.  524  -1.31  -1  .46  .029  -1 -22  i.812 
4  t  4  4  t4  4  t  4  t  i  *f 
(-2.19)  (-4.53)  (14.0)  ( .13>  (-4.20)  (-'6.84) 
Population  - .005  -003  .002  .004  .005  .001 
* 
AFOC  .656  -.  392  .226  -.  463  -.  586  -.  244 
(1.91)  (-.89>  (1.45)  (1.44)  (-1.37)  (-1  .38) 
School  i ng  .089  .035  .016  .081  .068  .02  6 
4  4  4  *  4  *  4*  * 
(21.5)  (7.52)  (22.4)  (20.8)  (15.0)  (29.8) 
Experience  .I06  .I13  .019  .076  .091 
t*  .007 
4  4  4  *  **  4* 
(14.5)  (19.0)  (27.6)  (10.3)  (15.51  (9.00) 
Experience'  - -001  - .006  - -0005  -.001  -  .004  - .0002 
*+  l  t  *  * 
Race  .093  .22  1  -087  .088  .I89  -.019 
t*  tt  t  * *  * 
(8.22)  (14.2)  (15.3)  (8.18)  (12.9)  (-3.04) 
Notes:  See data appendix for a description of the independent variables. 
significant at 0.10 level. 
** significant at 0.05 level 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyTable 3:  Effect of  Unions on  Part-Time Employment by  Age and Gender 
..................................................................................... 
Variables  1 6-  1  9  20-24  25-65 
Cons  tan  t  .I80  .459  . 106 
* 
Unemployment 
rate  -.  567  -.I13  .231  * 
(-1 .85)  (-.51)  (3.87) 
Population  - .004  - .004  - .0001 
AFDC  - .857  - .084  -.I37  * 
(-1.94)  (-.25)  (-1.54) 
School i  ng  .014  - .009  - .002  *  * 
Experience  - .052  - .046  - .003 
t 
(-5.56)  (-10.1  )  (-7.00) 
Experi  encez  .004  .002  * 
-000  1 
* * 
(4.42)  (6.24)  (6.97) 
Race  .I33  - .004  .004 
t  l 
(9.17)  (-.38)  (1.16) 
Females 
Notes:  See data appendix for a description of  the independent variables. 
*  significant at 0.10  level. 
** significant at 0.05 level. 
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